These canons appear entirely coincident with the views of the best authorities on the subject, as well as with the dictates of common sense ; and yet there lurks in them?we will not call it a fallacy but?a departure from the ordinary acceptation of terms, which lies at the root of that which we deem erroneous in the subsequent part of the work. We shall devote a short space, therefore, to the analysis of their meaning; which is more fully explained in the following quotation:
These canons appear entirely coincident with the views of the best authorities on the subject, as well as with the dictates of common sense ; and yet there lurks in them?we will not call it a fallacy but?a departure from the ordinary acceptation of terms, which lies at the root of that which we deem erroneous in the subsequent part of the work. We shall devote a short space, therefore, to the analysis of their meaning; which is more fully explained in the following quotation:
"The first proposition, that which stands at the head of this chapter, does not require much illustration. Its truth is so manifest, as hardly to admit of any doubt. It would seem almost impossible that there should be any difference of opinion as to its soundness or obscurity in its conception. I believe, nevertheless, it is true, that there has always been, and that there still is, in the minds of most men, and in those of philosophical thinkers, a somewhat imperfect, or confused, apprehension of its doctrines. I do not think that its truth is seen and felt, as it should be, in the simplicity, the purity, and the absoluteness, which belong to it.
The confusion, to which 1 allude, is this. There seems to be a common feeling, that the facts, phenomena, and events, with their relationships, classified and arranged, constitute, not the entire science, to which they belong, but only the foundation of the science. There is a feeling that these facts and relations are to be used as elements, out of which the science is to be built up, or We have now attempted to show that all application of remedies to disease must be to a certain extent hypothetical; and if this be granted, we do not think it will be denied that the greater the comprehensiveness of the hypothesis, and the more extended the foundation of ascertained facts on which it is erected, the greater will be the amount of confidence it deserves as a guide in the therapeutic art. The distinction between the scientific and the routine practitioner, therefore, is not in the employment of hypothesis by the former, and the rejection of it by the latter, but in the superior validity of the hypotheses adopted by the former over those assumed by the latter, arising out of the greater accuracy and more extensive range of the observations on which they are based.
Having said so much upon the general questions discussed by Dr. Bartlett, it is the less necessary that we should follow him into the particulars of the second portion of the work, which treats of the Philosophy of Medical Science. As already stated, we differ from him widely as to what constitutes Science ; and as there is scarcely any part of the Essay which is not imbued with the peculiar and (in our apprehension) erroneous view which he has taken of its character, there is very little with which we can heartily accord. The following passage expresses the chief peculiarity of his doctrine: Dr. 
